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Considerations on Lawyers' Fees (with a
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Peter Eggenberger*
I. Introduction
Lawyers are representatives of clients, officers of the legal system
and public citizens having special responsibility for the quality of
justice.1 Their conduct should conform to the requirements of the law,
both in professional service to clients and in their own business and
personal affairs.2 Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from the
conflict between lawyers' responsibilities to clients, to the legal system
and to their own interest in remaining upright persons while earning a
satisfactory living.3 Issues of professional discretion must be resolved
through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment.4
The legal profession has seen a major change over the last two
decades. Main factors for this development are the advent of
paralegalism, the introduction of office automation, the permissibility of
advertising, the advent of legal clinics, the growth of corporate and
government law departments, the development of legal insurance
programs, the growth of major law firms, the deteriorating image of the
profession and the growth in the number of law schools.5 Another factor
is the abolition of minimum-fee schedules as a result of the U.S.
* Attorney, Naegeli & Streichenberg, Zurich and Berne; lic. iur, University of St.
Gallen, Switzerland, 1995; LL.M. Tulane Law School, 2002. My thanks to Professor
Richard C. Stanley of Stanley & Flanagan, LLC, New Orleans, who taught a Professional
Responsibility Seminar at Tulane University and from whom I have learned much.
1. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
ANNOTATED (hereinafter MODEL RULES ANNOTATED), in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
STANDARDS, RULES & STATUTES 7 [1] (John S. Dzienkowski ed., 2001-2002).
2. Id. at 8 [4].
3. Id. at 8 [8].
4. Id. at 9 [8].
5. WARD C. BOWER, THE CHANGING LEGAL PROFESSION, in WIN-WIN BILLING
STRATEGIES 5-6 (Richard C. Reed ed., 1992).
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Supreme Court's decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.6  The
system of civil litigation is regarded as highly complex, privatized and
lawyer-dominated.7
In January 1993, the American Bar Association (hereinafter ABA)
commissioned a comprehensive survey of public attitudes toward the
standing of lawyers. One thousand two-hundred and two adults were
questioned. Lawyers' favorability rating was only 40%, compared to
teachers' 84% and pharmacists' 81%.8 Public complaints could be
placed into four categories: lack of caring and compassion; poor ethical
standards and enforcement; and greed and distasteful advertising. 9
According to this ABA survey, 59% consider tougher ethical standards
as top priority to cover the numerous client-lawyer relations complaints
not currently subject to the lawyer ethics code.'
Much of the public's unfavorable view of the legal profession can
be attributed to problems with prevalent billing practices." One of the
greatest challenges to the legal profession is overcoming the stigma that
lawyers are untrustworthy. The widespread practice of unethical hourly
billing is considered to be one of the reasons for this notion. 12 The ABA
itself considers as the gravest ethical problem with overbilling the
dishonesty that is required in order to engage in such billing methods.' 
3
But there are also many other variables that call for more creative
billing procedures. Among them are complexities of modem litigation,
increased competition for legal business, client pressure to reduce legal
expenses and achieve results, and more entrepreneurial, risk-accepting
lawyers. 14
Surprisingly, we can find divergent opinions about the ethics of
billing practices among the professionals themselves. Whereas a survey
in 1991 analyzing answers of 272 private lawyers and 80 corporate
counsel found out that only 7.3% believed their peers never deliberately
padded their hours to bill clients for work they had not actually
6. Id. at 5 (citing Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975)).
7. Samuel L. Gross, We Could Pass a Law... What Might Happen if Contingent
Legal Fees Were Banned, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 321, 345 (1998).
8. Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi. The Public Perception of Lawyers: ABA Poll,
A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 60, 62.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 64.
11. Sonia S. Chan, ABA Formal Opinion 93-379: Double Billing, Padding and
Other Forms of Overbilling, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 611, 637 (1996); RICHARD A.
ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANFORD, LEGAL ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 592 (1995).
12. Lee A. Watson, Communication, Honesty, and Contract: Three Buzzwords for
Maintaining Ethical Hourly Billing, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 189, 189 (1998).
13. Chan, supra note I1, at 619.
14. Donald C. Massey & Christopher A. D'Amour, The Ethical Consider-ations of
Alternative Fee Billing, 28 S.U. L. REv. 111, 116 (2001).
[Vol. 20:3
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON LAWYER'S FEES
performed,' 5 the Committee on Lawyer Business Ethics published a
report in 1998 pointing out: "The Committee believes that the
overwhelming majority of lawyers bill for their legal services in an
ethical manner."'
' 6
In this article, ethical aspects of different billing methods will be
discussed. An evaluation of some of the differences of the fee systems in
the United States and in Switzerland will follow. The main difference is
that in Switzerland contingent fees are generally not allowed. An
assessment of the most important billing methods and proposals for
improvements will constitute the second part of the article.
II. U.S. Fee System
A. General remarks
In general, clients and lawyers are free to contract for the fee that
the client has to pay.' 7 Lawyers owe their clients greater duties than are
owed under the general law of contracts.' 8 A fee agreement between
lawyer and client is not an ordinary business contract. The profession
has both an obligation of public service and duties to clients which
transcend ordinary business relation-ships and prohibit the lawyer from
taking advantage of the client.' 9
Fifty years ago, the amount of the typical lawyer's bill was
determined by what the lawyer considered appropriate. 20 The history of
the changing doctrines on the control of lawyers' fees in general includes
influential analogies from the English profession, strict statutory
regulation in the United States, the emphasis on complete freedom of
contract, the persistent use of court decisions and rules to provide
selective controls, bar association schedules, and the ever-present
pressures of custom.
2
'
The ABA, a national voluntary organization of lawyers, has
assumed the primary responsibility for promulgating national ethical
15. William G. Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 RUTGERS L. REV.
1, 93 (1991).
16. Committee on Lawyer Business Ethics (hereinafter Committee), Business and
Ethics Implications of Alternative Billing Practices: Report on Alternative Billing
Arrangements, 54 Bus. LAW. 175, 178 (1998).
17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (hereinafter
RESTATEMENT) § 34 b (2000).
18. Id.
19. Brown & Sturm v. Frederick Road Ltd., 768 A.2d 62, 79 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2001).
20. ZITRIN & LANGFORD, supra note 11, at 585.
21. F.B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 211 (1964).
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standards for the legal profession. In 1983, the ABA published its new
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. There are 55 Rules, divided into 8
sections (client-lawyer relationship, counselor, advocate, transactions
with persons other than clients, law firms and associations, public
service, information about legal services, and maintaining the integrity of
the profession).
Although the ABA's Model Rules only have force as a body of
rules with its voluntary members, various states and federal courts have
looked to the ABA versions as a basis for regulating lawyers within the
jurisdiction.22 Courts often regard the ABA Rules as highly persuasive
authority.23 The rules provide a framework for the ethical practice of
law, guidance to lawyers, and a structure for regulating conduct through
24disciplinary agencies. Every lawyer should be responsible for
observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct.25 Although the ABA
Rules are persuasive authority in courts, the controlling authority for the
ethics of U.S. lawyers remains whatever set of ethical rules has been
adopted in their state of licensure. All 50 states have adopted (with
variations) some form of the ABA Model Rules or some form of the
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility.
B. Rule 1.5 Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.5 (a) requires reasonable fees and states various criteria for
the determination of reasonableness. Rule 1.5 (c) allows an agreement
on a fee contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is
rendered. Rule 1.5 (d) prohibits an agreement of a contingent fee in
domestic relations matters and for repre-senting a defendant in a criminal
case. According to Rule 1.5 (c), a contingent fee shall be in writing and
state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the
percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of
settlement.
Rule 1.5 is specific about the cases in which the contingent fee is
prohibited, but silent when it is advisable. The Rule has therefore been
criticized as "too vague. 26
C. Other Model Rules
Rule 1.8 (j) (2) repeats that lawyers are allowed to contract with a
client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case whereas otherwise
22. MODEL RULES ANNOTATED, supra note 1, at 4.
23. Brown & Sturm, 768 A.2d at 79.
24. MODEL RULES ANNOTATED, supra note 1, at 10-11 [2], [6]
25. Id. at 9 [11].
26. Watson, supra note 12, at 195.
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they shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or
subject matter of litigation.
Various other provisions of the Rules implicitly affect ethical
considerations regarding fees. Rule 1.2 requires a lawyer to abide by a
client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation. Rule 1.4
(a) requires that lawyers keep their clients reasonably informed about the
status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for
information.
To the extent that any Rule is needed to state the obvious principle
that a lawyer should not bill excessive time to a client, the general
proscription on conflicts of interest in Rule 1.7 should remind lawyers of
the potential tension between a client's actual needs and the lawyer's
economic interests.2 7
D. Determination of Fee
The core of the Model Rules' treatment of billing is their emphasis
on the reasonableness of the fee. What constitutes a reasonable fee
varies with the facts and circumstances. There is no precise measure of
reasonableness.28 The courts have the inherent power to determine the
reasonableness of a lawyer's fee and to refuse the enforcement of any
contract that calls for clearly excessive or unreasonable fees.29 State bars
and other lawyer regula-tory agencies have rarely imposed discipline for
charging excessive fees.30
Model Rule 1.5 (a) enumerates the following criteria for the
determination of the reasonableness of a lawyer's fee: the time and labor
required; novelty and difficulty of questions; skill requisite to perform
legal service properly; preclusion of other employment; customary fee;
amount involved and results obtained; time limit-ations; nature and
length of professional relationship; experience, reputation, and ability of
lawyer; and fixed or contingent fee. These factors were also set forth in
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express Inc, 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.
1974).
Although the Rules provide only an outline for measuring the
reasonableness of a fee, they indicate that time should not be the sole
standard for the calculation of a fee. The determination of the
reasonableness of a lawyer's fee should not turn merely on the economic
benefit received by the lawyer's clients, although it should be tied to
27. Ross, supra note 15, at 24.
28. McCabe v. Arcidy, 635 A.2d 446, 452 (N.H. 1993).
29. Pfeifer v. Sentry Ins., 745 F. Supp 1434, 1443 (E.D. Wis. 1990).
30. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING,
HANDBOOK ON MODEL RULES 8-10 (1990).
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some benefit.31
III. Swiss Fee System
A. General Remarks
Switzerland is a civil law country with an inquisitorial system. The
primary distinction between an adversarial and an inquisitorial system
lies in the distribution of authority between lawyers and judges. In an
adversary system, parties develop the case and the judge is a largely
passive umpire; whereas in an inquisitorial system, the judge or a panel
of judges acts as director and also as decisionmaker, and lawyers play a
less central role.32
Inquisitorial systems generally place less importance on protection
of individual freedom and more emphasis on efficiency, uniformity, and
equality of treatment.33 Unlike the American system, with its sharp
division between trial and pretrial proceedings, the inquisitorial format
involves a series of proceedings which seek to minimize overpreparation,
inefficiency and surprise.34 Lawyers may face similar economic pressure
under both systems. The American view is, however, that in an
inquisitorial system the need for tactical maneuvers is less relevant and
fewer incentives for unnecessary preparation and meter running exist.
35
The Swiss view is that an adversarial system and the common law
require in general more work for a lawyer than an inquisitorial system.
3 6
B. Cantonal Law
Switzerland is divided into 26 states called cantons. The Swiss
Constitution guarantees in art. 64 and 64bis that the organization of the
judicial system as well as the rules for civil and criminal procedures
remain in the competence of the cantons. Each canton has enacted
referring statutes.
In the scope of this competence, the cantons are allowed to regulate
lawyers' fees for trials. 37 Because of the diversity of the cantonal judicial
31. ZITRIN & LANGFORD, supra note 11, at 585.
32. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Persuasive Method, in GEOFFERY C. HAZARD &
DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 251-52
(1994).
33. Id. at 253.
34. Id. at 252.
35. Id. at 253.
36. HEINRICH GATTIKER, DAS ERFOLGSHONORAR DES ANWALTS:
CHANCENGLEICHHEIT IM RECHTLICHEN KONFLIKT? 134 (1975).
37. LORENZ HOCHLI, DAS ANWALTSHONORAR 49 (1991).
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systems and statutes, the fees for trials must be determined by cantonal,
not federal law.38
C. Rule 13 Swiss Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The Swiss Bar Association (hereinafter SAV), a national voluntary
organization of lawyers, has passed in 1973 twenty-four Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. The Rules are divided into three sections (general
duties, duties towards the client, duties towards other lawyers; see
appendix). The Rules are being revised at present, but the results will
only be disclosed at the end of 2002 at the earliest.
39
The Model Rules have been adopted by almost every Cantonal Bar
Association. 0  The Rules govern the professional conduct of all
members of the referring Bar Association. 41 The Rules are set by private
organizations, but the courts often consider them in their decision-
making process.42 The Rules are usually stricter than the cantonal law.43
Rule 13 regulates lawyers' fees. It says primarily that lawyers shall
charge within the scope of the usage applicable in their canton, in the
absence of an agreement with the client as to the professional fee.
Lawyers may agree to an all-inclusive fee for legal advice. This should
correspond with their expected services. Rule 13 finally forbids an
agreement with a contingent fee.
D. Determination of Fee
In civil and criminal cases, the lawyer is bound by the tariffs of the
cantonal legislator.44 The fees are calculated by a percentage of the
amount in controversy, combined with other factors like necessary time
spent, material and legal difficulties of the case and responsibility of the
lawyer.45 The Swiss Supreme Court has judged this cantonal way of
calculating lawyers' fees as constitutional.46  If the amount in
controversy cannot be calculated, as in criminal cases and certain civil
cases, the fee is determined by the amount of time spent.47 The cantons,
38. Id. at 39 n.48.
39. SAV-email of 10/18/2001 to the author.
40. HOCHLI, supra note 37, at 102 n.427.
41. GATTIKER, supra note 36, at 34.
42. Id. at 34.
43. GIOVANNI ANDREA TESTA, DIE ZIVIL- UND STANDANDESRECHTLICHEN PFLICHTEN
DES RECHTSANWALTES GEGENOBER DEM KLIENTEN 8 (2001).
44. HOCHLI, supra note 37, at 41.
45. Id. at 43.
46. Decision published only in a cantonal publication (ZR 87 (1988) 90), but not in
the official reporter of the Swiss Supreme Court.
47. HOCHLI, supra note 37, at 45.
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like the Model Rules, have established the prohibition of contingent fees
in their tariffs.48 The Swiss Supreme Court has already at the beginning
of the last century upheld this ban of contingent fees as constitutional on
the grounds of a superior power of the lawyer towards the client and the
danger of speculation.49 In a recent decision, the court has affirmed this
decision and especially mentioned the dangers of unconscionability and
dependency.5°
Based on Rule 13, the Cantonal Bar Associations have passed rules
for the determination of the fees for non-forensic lawyering. The
priniciple is the same as in the United States. The fee has to be
reasonable in proportion to the time spent and the responsibility taken.5
Usually, the fee is calculated on an hourly basis with possible additions
depending on the value of the object or interest dealt with.52
If clients are not satisfied with their lawyer's bill, three procedures
are available. First, they can file a suit against their lawyer in a cantonal
court. This procedure is normal in civil litigation. Second, they can take
a special proceeding with a judge called moderation in which the judge
sets the amount of the fee in a binding, but not directly enforceable
way. 53 Third, they can file a complaint with the cantonal governmental
Supervisory Board for Lawyers. 4  The judges as well as the
governmental Supervisory Board will take the Rules of the Bar
Associations concerning lawyers' fees into consideration when they have
to decide on the reasonableness of a fee.
55
IV. Contingent Fee
A. Definition
The U.S. Supreme Court defines a fee as contingent if the obligation
to pay depends on the lawyering obtaining a particular result. 56 The size
or payment of the fee is conditioned on some measure of the client's
48. GATrIKER, supra note 36, at 32.
49. BGE 41 11 481 (Reporter of the Swiss Supreme Court, Volume 41 (year 1916),
section II (civil law), page 481).
50. BGE 113 Ia 279 (Reporter of the Swiss Supreme Court, Volume 113 (year
1988), section Ia (constitutional law), page 279).
51. HOCHLI, supra note 37, at 34, 38, 47-48.
52. Id. at 96.
53. TESTA, supra note 43, at 244-45. The exact procedure and the explanation why
the judgment is binding, but not directly enforceable are rather complicated. I therefore
do not go into further details.
54. HOCHLi, supra note 37, at 57.
55. Id. at 96.
56. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 561 (1992).
[Vol. 20:3
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON LAWYER'S FEES
success.57 The contingency fee is very often associated with the plaintiff
side of personal injury cases; however, in the defense or commercial
litigation context, a contingency fee may be reasonably subject to
calculation based on the value of a deal closed or by basing the fee on the
amount the plaintiff is actually paid versus some higher demanded
amount.
58
The contingent fee has been called a "uniquely American
development."59 The contingency fee has developed from a once illegal
practice to an essential element of the American legal system.60 A study
of professional economics and responsibilities in 1964 noticed that
contingent fees were the dominant method at that time.6' In the 1970s,
the method of hourly billing became predom-inant.62  But the
contingency fee is still "one of the defining characteristics of civil
litigation in the United States."
63
B. Functions
Contingent fee arrangements perform three valuable functions.
First, they enable persons who could not otherwise afford counsel to
assert their rights, paying their lawyers only if the assertion succeeds.
64
The contingency fee system is regarded as "extremely important for
insuring access to the civil justice system. 65  Second, contingent fees
give lawyers an additional incentive to seek their clients' success and to
encourage only those clients with claims having a substantial likelihood
of succeeding.66 Third, such fees enable a client to share the risk of
losing with a lawyer, who is usually better able to assess the risk and to
bear it by undertaking similar arrangements in other cases. 6' The
Supreme Court also emphasizes the possibility of risk-pooling of a
lawyer operating on a contingency-fee basis.68
A contingent-fee contract allocates to the lawyer the risk that the
57. RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § 35a.
58. Massey/D'Amour, supra note 14, at 119.
59. MACKINNON, supra note 21, at 209.
60. Kristin A. Porcu, Protecting the Poor: The Dangers ofAltering the Contingency
Fee System, 5 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & App. ADVOC. 149, 149 (2000). For a survey of the
history of contingency fees, see id. at 150-53.
61. MACKINNON, supra note 21, at 205.
62. Watson, supra note 12, at 190.
63. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal
Practice, 47 DEPAuL L. REv. 267, 267 (1998).
64. RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § 35b.
65. Kritzer, supra note 63, at 268.
66. RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § 35b.
67. Id.
68. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. at 565.
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case will require much time and produce no recovery and to the client the
risk that the case will require little time and produce a substantial fee.69
In fact, uncertainty seems to be the main reason for the contingency fee
system,7 ° and risk-sharing has emerged as a complementary justification
for contingent fees. 7 1 The client purchases additional services under a
contingency fee arrangement, namely financing and a form of
insurance.72 The contingency lawyer finances the litigation for the client
while a case is pending.73 If the lawyer obtains no recovery for the client,
the lawyer absorbs the entire opportunity cost of the time expended on
the case and effectively insures the client for the value of the lawyer's
time.74 On a successful outcome, on the other hand, lawyers typically
receive from 33% to 40% of the proceeds recovered.75
Where a lawyer invokes the court's equitable power to approve a
settlement agreement to distribute the proceeds, the court must scrutinize
the reasonableness of the contingent lawyer's fee contract which affects
the net recovery to the plaintiff.76 A tribunal might find a contingent fee
unreasonable due to a defect in the calculation of risk in two cases in
particular: those in which there was a high likelihood of substantial
recovery by trial or settlement, so that the lawyer bore only little risk of
nonpayment, and those in which the client's recovery was likely to be so
large that the lawyer's fee would clearly exceed the sum appropriate to
pay for services performed and risks assumed.77
V. Hourly Fee
Hourly billing means that the lawyer charges a fee that is the result
of the time spent multiplied by a certain hourly rate. This fee, as must all
lawyers' fees, has to be reasonable. 78 The hourly fee would be that
charged by lawyers of similar experience and other credentials in
comparable cases, but not more than the standard rate of the lawyer in
question for that type of work. 79 The lawyer must show, by records or
otherwise, the hours actually and reasonably devoted to the case in view
69. RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, §34c.
70. Porcu, supra note 60, at 163.
71. Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees without Contingencies: Hamlet without the
Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REv. 29, 43 (1989).
72. Kritzer, supra note 63, at 270.
73. Id
74. Id.
75. Laurel L. Burke, Alternative Billing Methods: Notjust by the Hour anymore, 28-
APR COLO. LAW 59, 61 (1999).
76. Hoffertv. Gen. Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 161, 165 (5th Cir. 1981).
77. RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § 35 c.
78. See id. §§ 2 (d), 3 (d).
79. Id. § 39c.
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of the importance of the case to the client, the client's financial situation
and instructions, and the time that a comparable lawyer would have
needed.80
Hourly fees are a common contractual basis of payment for legal
services. Surveys imply that this method is presently the most common
method of billing in the United States. A survey of almost 300 private
lawyers found that in more than 97% of the law firms represented hourly
billing was the principal type of billing. 
1
As we have seen,8 2 until the late 60s the main billing method was
the contingent fee. Since then, most lawyers in private civil practice
have based their fees almost entirely upon the number of hours that they
83have expended on services for their clients. One author predicts:
"Hourly billing remains the standard, and it will likely be the norm into
the foreseeable future. 84 Another author sees that "clients, law firms,
legal consultants, and commentators are sharply divided about the future
of hourly billing., 85 Yet another author predicted in 1987 that hourly
rates for legal work would soon be replaced by fixed-fee prices. He
mentioned four main factors for such a development: hourly time records
and metered technical support allocable to specific types of cases and/or
clients; accumulation and analysis of costs of production based on a large
number of cases by experienced people; demand for fixed fees by clients;
and competition from a growing number of lawyers and law firms.8
6
Another author supported this view in 1994: "Flat fee, or partially flat
fee billing might well become much more prevalent."87
VI. Alternative Billing Methods
The Business Lawyers Committee has noticed a "growing lure of
alternatives" to the traditional and predominant billing methods of
contingent and hourly fees.88 One reason for this notion can be that
clients, sophisticated or not, want alternatives to traditional hourly billing
80. Id.
81. Massey & D'Amour, supra note 14, at 111 with further references.
82. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § 4(a).
83. Ross, supra note 15, at 2.
84. Douglas R. Richmond, Professional Responsibility and the Bottom Line: The
Ethics of Billing, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 261, 262 (1996).
85. WILLIAM G. Ross, THE HONEST HOUR, THE ETHICS OF TIME-BASED BILLING BY
ATTORNEYS 237 (1996).
86. Jay G. Foonberg, The Short, Happy Life of Hourly Fee Billing, in BEYOND THE
BILLABLE HOUR, AN ANTHOLOGY OF ALTERNATIVE BILLING METHODS 25 (Richard C.
Reed ed. 1989).
87. Carl M. Selinger, Inventing Billable Hours: Contract v. Fairness in Charging
Attorney's Fees, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 671, 677 (1994).
88. Committee, supra note 16, at 190.
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because of a quality-value perception that emphasizes solutions, results,
and benefits obtained rather than the time spent on a project. 89 Another
reason can be that a lawyer should offer the client alternative bases for
the fee and explain their implications when there is doubt whether a
contingent fee is consistent with the client's best interest.90 The ABA
approves in its opinion 94-389 a contingency fee if the fee is reasonable
and the client is fully advised of alternative fees.
The fixed or flat fee is the price that will be charged for defined
services. It may be the total fee for the engagement or may apply to
segments of the total services. It may stand alone or be combined with
either an hourly fee or a contingent fee. 91 If the fixed or flat fee is
combined with an hourly rate, the portions of the services that can be
defined as to scope of services are charged on a fixed- or flat-fee basis,
and the portions of the services that are not capable of being defined
because of variables or uncertainties are charged on a time-rate or hourly
basis.92
The lodestar method has its origin in the federal court system in
Lindy Bros. Builders Inc. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
487 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir. 1973). The method consists of multiplying the
hours spent by a reasonable billing rate per hour to determine the
lodestar. This amount is then multiplied by a factor to recognize factors
other than time spent.
93
The blended hourly rate is a hybrid of the hourly rate. Instead of
specific hourly rates for individual fee chargers, one rate applies to all
hours billed on a matter. 94 This rate is usually lower with the possibility
of a larger payment based on some potential result. 95 The contingency
factor can also be taken into account by agreeing upon one portion of the
fee being hourly billed (e.g., pretrial activities), the other portion being
measured by the achieved result (e.g., trial phase).96
Phased billing is one of the more complex variations on standard
hourly billing. In phased billing, a budget is negotiated between client
and lawyer based on phases of time and activity. As hourly bills are
submitted, any amounts over the agreed budget for a phase are put into a
89. Burke, supra note 75, at 59.
90. MODEL RULES ANNOTATED, supra note 1, at 22 (3).
91. Reed, supra note 5, at 89; ZITRIN & LANGFORD, supra note 11, at 591; Chan,
supra note 11, at 626.
92. Reed, supra note 5, at 94-95; Burke, supra note 75, 60.
93. Reed, supra note 5, at 103.
94. Id. at 93.
95. Massey & D'Amour, supra note 14, at 121.
96. Reed, supra note 5, at 96; Porcu, supra note 60, at 165; BRADFORD W.
HILDEBRANDT, ALTERNATIVE PRICING PRACTICES 106 (1995); South Carolina Ethics
Opinion 84-11.
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suspense account. Counsel can recoup these fees upon successful under-
budget completion of earlier or later phases or the entire engagement.97
The relative-value method of billing involves creating schedules
that break down the services by subject matter and by task and assigning
a relative value or multiplier to each. The value of each component
service or task has to be determined. Once the relative-value schedules
have been established, the base rate factor can be changed. The relative-
value method combines elements of hourly, fixed- or flat-fee, and value
billing.98 Value billing is based on the value to the client of the services
rendered. It requires a clear arrangement as to the value to the client of
the service provided, often over a fairly wide range of possible outcomes
and with a whole number of factors to be considered in setting the final
fee. 99
The percentage fee is based on a schedule of fees related to the
amount involved in the matter being handled. The amount may be
predetermined or may, in some instances, be related to the amount
ultimately determined. The percentage rate may be constant or
graduated. 100
Sliding percentage fees are schedules for contingent percentage fees
under which the percentage rate increases as the litigation progresses
from stage to stage or with the number of hours worked, or under which
the percentage rate decreases as the size of recovery increases.10 1
The reverse contingent fee is a percentage of the amount the client
saved through the lawyer's effort, namely a stated portion of the
difference between the amount originally claimed by the plaintiff and the
amount the client is ultimately required to pay.1
0 2
Other possible methods are the conversion of a contingent fee to an
hourly fee,' 0 3 in kind payments such as taking an equity share of the
corporate client,'0 4 unbundled fees (basic legal research from outsource
97. Committee, supra note 16, at 184.
98. Reed, supra note 5, at 104; Burke, supra note 75, at 62.
99. Committee, supra note 16, at 185; Chan, supra note 11, at 627.
100. Reed, supra note 5, at 97; Committee, supra note 16, at 186; Burke, supra note
75, at 61.
101. Massey & D'Amour, supra note 14, at 121; Kevin M. Clermont & John D.
Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 529, 567, 594-95, 597
(1978); Porcu, supra note 60, at 164. A contingent-fee contract does not impose an
automatic ceiling on an award of lawyer's fees, Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 93
(1989).
102. Brian P. Voke, Ethical Considerations in Alternative Fee Agreements for the
Defense Lawyer, 30-SUM Brief 64, 66 (2001); ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 41:905 (1994).
103. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 30, § 8.16.
104. Massey & D'Amour, supra note 14, at 121.
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providers), 10 5 the loaning of a lawyer, 0 6 the sale of a claim to the
lawyer, 0 7 and the client's borrowing against his claim.'
08
Sometimes, the methods mentioned may be combined with caps, 10 9
minima, incentive boni, l l0 credits against future unrelated legal work,
guarantees of satisfaction, and other creative mechanisms that foster a
mutually trusting relationship between the lawyer and the client. 1 '
VII. Ethical Assessment of Various Billing Methods
Almost any fee arrangement between lawyers and clients may give
rise to a conflict. A lawyer employed at a daily or hourly rate would
have a conflicting interest to drag the case on beyond the point of
maximum benefit to the client. The contingent fee contract creates a
conflict when either the lawyer or the client needs a quick settlement
while the other's interest would be better served by pressing on in the
hope of a greater recovery. A lawyer who received a flat fee in advance
would have a conflicting interest to dispose of the case as quickly as
possible, to the client's disad-vantage. The variations of this kind of
conflict are infinite.
As many clients seem to become more sensitized to the need for
control over fees, they and their lawyers will work more closely to find
acceptable solutions." 2 But if it has to come to a trial because the client
and lawyer cannot negotiate a settlement, judges appear to have
approved most or all of the time submitted by lawyers in most reported
decisions.' 13
In examining the ethical impacts of various billing methods, you
will notice that most of the authors treat only contingent and hourly
fees,"14 and that they will generally find more negative than positive
aspects. Alternative billing forms besides fixed/flat fees are rarely ever
evaluated.
105. Committee, supra note 16, at 183.
106. Id. at 186.
107. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 101, at 596; Kritzer, supra note 63, at 308,
even proposes an auction for the service of lawyers.
108. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 101, at 597.
109. Committee, supra note 16, at 182.
110. ZITRIN & LANGFORD, supra note 11, at 591.
111. Burke, supra note 75, at 62.
112. ZITRIN & LANGFORD, supra note 11, at 592.
113. Ross, supra note 15, at 13.
114. Ross, id. at 83, even writes: "Discussions of the ethics of fees have concentrated
almost entirely upon contingent fees and virtually have ignored hourly billing."
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A. Contingent Fee
Allowing contingent fees requires an exception to the long-standing
ethical precept that in order to maintain independent professional
judgment on behalf of the client, a lawyer must not acquire a proprietary
interest in the client's case.
115
The reasons for the ban of contingent fees in Switzerland are based
on the duties of the lawyer towards the client, towards the government
and towards the guild.' 16 The loyalty of the lawyer towards the client
should prevent him from exploiting the client. The contingent fee is
considered to have the inherent danger of a client's being ripped off
because the client cannot assess the risk of a trial. 17 The possible self-
interest of the lawyer in the case is regarded as a potential for unfair trial
conduct. 118 The duties towards the guild are believed to be in jeopardy
by a loss of independence of the lawyer and his being reduced to a
business partner of the client.1 9 Besides this, there is the fear of a loss of
dignity of the guild, improper solicitation, and commercialization of the
profession. 120
The lawyer's speculative interest in the claim is also one of the most
common objections to a contingent fee in the United States. This
objection has deep historical roots, but more recently it has come to rest
on arguments that the speculative nature of the lawyer's interest is
inconsistent with professional detachment and that this converts
lawyering from a profession into a mere business. 121 The lawyer's
economic interest in the outcome may tempt him to use improper tactics
for ensuring victory and to slight the duties as an officer of the court;
further, lawyers may find themselves unable to act disinterestedly in
advising their client and unwilling to allow client participation in
controlling the lawsuit. 22 The result may be an increase in abuses caused
by the lawyers' economic self-interests.
Contingent fees can give incentives to the lawyer to minimize time
and risk in order to maximize return, whereas the client would seek to
maximize the lawyer's time and risk in order to minimize risk and
maximize return. It is the lawyer who steers the process, and the client is
usually not able to judge whether or not the lawyer's self-interest
determines the extent of work and assistance for the client's case. The
115. ZITRIN & LANGFORD, supra note 11, at 192.
116. GATTIKER, supra note 36, at 38.
117. Id. at 38; HOCHLI, supra note 37, at 84.
118. GATTIKER, supra note 36, at 38, 122.
119. Id. at 39.
120. TESTA, supra note 43, at 222.
121. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 101, at 570.
122. Id
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timing and the amount of recovery seems to be a main conflict of interest
if the lawyer is given a percentage of the recovery.1
23
The agreement on a contingent fee implies other ethical problems.
Impairment of the lawyer's screening faculties by a "pot of gold"
mentality may encourage groundless speculative suits. 124 The premium
may also override lawyer's ethical reluctance to bring nuisance suits.1
25
Solicitation of lucrative cases could be another consequence. 26 The
premium induces other ethical violations by causing the lawyer to view a
proffered case as a valuable com-modity; thus, lawyers sometimes will
refuse to refer the case away although they ethically should or will
demand a heavy forwarding fee although they ethically should not.127 A
pure referral fee would be unethical in most U.S. jurisdictions under Rule
1.5 (e).
On the other hand, the agreement of a contingent fee enhances the
access of indigent persons to court. 28 Its function as a financing device
that enables a client to prosecute an otherwise unaffordable claim is the
most commonly cited historic justification for the contingent fee. 12 9 Part
of a contingent fee can be seen as payment for assuming the risk that
there will be no or no sufficient recovery; second, the contingent fee
lawyer virtually never receives any compensation until the case is
completed and thus can be said to provide a financing service. 13°
Economic alignment brings with it at least three benefits that can
offset the problems it induces. First, a virtual guarantee of at least that
amount of zeal on which the adversary system depends; second, a virtual
guarantee that the inevitable deviations from impartiality on the part of
the lawyer will be in direction of alignment rather than misalignment of
lawyer's and client's interest; and third, an increase in client satisfaction
stemming from the feeling that the lawyer is a partner in interest.3 In
too closely aligning themselves with the client, lawyers may even take on
unacceptable reputational and financial risks.'
32
The fear of frivolous cases can be dampened by the fact that the
lawyer is likely to abstain from any case with such a low probability of
123. Id. at 569, 575 n.146; ZiTR'N & LANGFORD, supra note 11, at 190; Massey &
D'Amour, supra note 14, at 119; Porcu, supra note 60, at 149-50.
124. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 101, at 574.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. with further references.
128. ZITR1N & LANGFORD, supra note 11, at 190.
129. Brickman, supra note 71, at 43.
130. Herbert M. Kritzer, et al., The Impact of Fee Arrangement on Lawyer Effort, 19
LAW & Soc'y REV. 250, 255 n.4 (1985); Gross, supra note 7, at 322.
131. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 101, at 570.
132. Committee, supra note 16, at 195.
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success that it makes the case a bad investment. Under a contingent fee,
the primary screening function shifts to the lawyer, and the lawyer will
probably do a more effective screening job than the client. 133
A contingent fee can also motivate lawyers to work more diligently
since their compensation depends upon their clients' recovery. 134 There
is even the opinion that contingent fees could foster overzealous
advocacy. 35 The contingent fee is then to be seen as a reward for the
good performance of the lawyer. 136 It is well possible that such a system
discourages the filing of small, but meritorious cases. But we must not
forget that for a large proportion of contingency fee cases like those
seeking injunctive or other equitable relief there is no "market
treatment."1
37
Certainly, contingent fees place an added responsibility on the
lawyers and make it harder for them to advise their clients objectively. It
is not without reason that contingent fees are even in the United States
are not even allowed in criminal and in domestic relations cases. In
criminal cases, paying lawyers a premium for acquittal would cause them
to encourage their clients to turn down favorable plea bargains and to go
to trial. 138 And in divorce or custody cases, a contingent fee would create
incentives to dis-courage reconciliation and encourage bitter and
wounding court battles.'
39
B. Hourly Fee
Originally praised for its objectivity and efficiency, hourly billing
increasingly has been condemned for encouraging ineffi-ciency,
excessive litigation, and fraud. 140  The padding of bills is almost
impossible to prove since there is no objective way to measure, except
within very broad limits, the amount of time that a lawyer needs to spend
on any particular task.' 4' Billable hours have steadily risen over the
years. A study in 1965 found normal billing hours of 1,400 to 1,600 a
year for associates and 1,200 to 1,400 for partners.142 A 1995 survey
showed that the average number of billable hours by partners ranged
from 1,513 to 1,847 a year and associate hours from 1,649 to 1,907.143
133. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 101, at 570-7 1.
134. Brickman, supra note 71, at 44.
135. RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, § 35b.
136. HOCHLI, supra note 37, at 84.
137. City of Burlington v. Dague, 506 U.S. at 564.
138. ZITRIN & LANGFORD, supra note 11, at 192.
139. RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, at § 35g.
140. Ross, supra note 85, at 1 with further references.
141. Id. at 2.
142. Id. at 3 with further reference.
143. Id. with further reference.
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How can a method called "the most fair and efficient method of
compensation,"' 144 admired for its "simplicity,,,' 145 and deemed "the best
technique as long as lawyers are honest,"' 146 be so harshly criticized?
Hourly billing can be problematic for many reasons, including lack
of incentive for lawyers to settle early, use of unnecessary personnel and
improper delegation, increased charges for inexper-ienced personnel,
inaccurate time records, unrealistic quotas for timekeeping, lack of risk
sharing, lack of predictability of ultimate fee, performance of work
without value to client, and insufficient evaluation of client
satisfaction. 147 Hourly billing can also be an incentive for failure to
utilize modem technologies, duplication of work, excessive research,
minimum billing increments, charges for internal conferences, vague
time entries, and overstaffing.1
48
Billing by the hour can put the client's and the lawyer's interests in
direct conflict. The client wants the matter resolved as quickly, smoothly
and inexpensively as possible. The lawyer on the other hand gets paid
more the longer the matter carries on.149 There is no relationship
between the task and the bill for the task. Lawyers get benefits for
unproductive tasks, but not their clients. 150 The client has no input into
how the lawyer's time is spent on the file. 15' One major problem with
charging by the hour is that the hourly billing system in and of itself
cannot realistically predict how much litigation will ultimately cost.152 In
the litigation context, billing by the hour forces clients and their counsel
to think carefully about strategy and the need to perform certain tasks
when budgeting a project, thereby controlling costs and preventing need-
less expenditures. 153 Lawyers answer only to their conscience in being
honest; the method keeps honest lawyers within the bound-aries of
ethical behavior, but fails to ground the unscrupulous.
154
Using the hourly billing system, the inefficient lawyer makes more
money than the knowledgeable, high-tech lawyer who can turn out
144. Douglas R. Richmond, The New Law Firm Economy, Billable Hours, and
Professional Responsibility, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 207, 210 (2000).
145. Ross, supra note 15, at 84.
146. Ross, supra note 85, at 245.
147. Burke, supra note 75, at 59.
148. Ross, supra note 15, at 29-70; Richmond, supra note 144, at 222.
149. Jeffery L. Tolman, Billing by the Hour Should Be Banned, in BEYOND THE
BILLABLE HOUR, AN ANTHOLOGY OF ALTERNATIVE BILLING METHODS 73 (Richard C.
Reed ed. 1989).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Massey & D'Amour, supra note 14, at 116.
153. Richmond, supra note 144, at 210.
154. Watson, supra note 12, at 191-92.
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quality work quickly.' 55 A lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement
based primarily on hourly charges by using wasteful procedures. 56 On
the other hand, an unreasonable limitation on the hours lawyers may
spend on a client should be avoided as a threat to their ability to fulfill
their obligation under Model Rule 1.1 to "provide competent
representation to a client.'
' 57
C. Fixed/Flat fee
Ethics boards in Connecticut, New Hampshire, Oregon, and
Wisconsin have held that a flat fee representation is permissible and does
not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct in each respective state. 58
This billing method is most commonly used for routine services and
volume work done on a repetitive basis.1 59  The flat fee eliminates
uncertainty and fee disputes with clients because clients theoretically
know what the fee will be ahead of time. It also provides more freedom
for lawyers in case management. Furthermore, because the fee is set,
there is a great incentive for lawyers to be efficient.16 Because the fee is
based on factors other than just the amount of time spent, there is an
incentive for the development of forms and systems, and the utilization
of tech-nology and legal assistants or other support staff to provide
services. 161
On the other hand, fixed fees may be more likely to create conflicts
between lawyers and clients because this form of billing is less clearly
defined and permits greater opportunities for negotiation. But because
the fee is predetermined, it raises conflict of interest issues. It might
limit lawyer representation and lower quality of service when
representation becomes unprofitable. 162  The grouping of cases and
homogeneity of treatment could diminish the frequency of individualized
and nuanced presentations of fine legal points. 163 Lawyers could also be
pressured to standardize the ways they handle their cases because the
economic premium will be on generic, patterned approaches.' 64
155. Richmond, supra note 144, at 210.
156. MODEL RULES ANNOTATED, supra note 1, at 22 [3].
157. ZITRIN & LANGFORD, supra note 11, at 594.
158. Voke, supra note 102, at 69.
159. Chan, supra note 11, at 626; Reed, supra note 5, at 90.
160. Chan, supra note 11, at 626.
161. Ezra Tom Clark Jr., Getting Out of the Hourly Rate Quagmire - Other Billing
Alternatives, in BEYOND THE BILLABLE HOUR, AN ANTHOLOGY OF ALTERNATIVE BILLING
METHODS 185 (Richard C. Reed ed. 1989).
162. Chan, supra note 11, at 626; Watson, supra note 12, at 200; Ross, supra note 85,
at 240.
163. Chan, supra note 11, at 626.
164. Id.
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Furthermore, a fixed or flat fee measures the value of the legal services
rendered imperfectly.' 65  Flat fees have especially been held to be
unethical in the insurance defense context, where they are seen as a
potential disincentive to zealous advocacy.
166
A fixed legal fee so low that it forces the lawyer to perform less
than competently would not be reasonable, and the agreement would
violate the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. If the fixed fee were
so low that lawyers would have to put their own personal and financial
interests ahead of the interest of the client, the resultant conflict of
interest would also violate the Rules.
167
D. Other Forms
Authors believe that alternative forms of billing would not
necessarily encourage a higher degree of lawyer honesty, 168 would have
greater potentials for misunderstanding and liability,1 69 would not be
satisfactory, 170 and would fail to reduce fees or costs.' 71
One author considers a time-based lodestar adjusted by other factors
as the best method.172 This method would, in his opinion, be superior to
hourly and value billing as it would provide a reason-ably objective basis
for billing, namely time, and would allow for other factors that should
properly be reflected in the calculation of a bill. 173 The prospect of a
diminution of fees for insufficiency or an increment based upon quality
would help to discourage the time-wasting of time-based systems. The
adjusted lodestar system would also discourage padding to the extent that
it would enable lawyers to recover for the honest value of their work,
eliminate the dishonesty of surreptitious adjustments and remove much
of the pressure to bill massive numbers of hours that afflicts so many
lawyers. 174  Others think, however, that this method provokes
inefficiency, discourages early settlement, is too complicated, and may
not reflect the market value of the services. 1
75
Hybrid fees put more pressure on the lawyer's ability to maintain
independent professional judgment, especially since the more
complicated the fee arrangement, the harder it will be, particularly for
165. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 101, at 567-568.
166. Richmond, supra note 144, at 210 n.22 with further references.
167. Voke, supra note 102, at 67-68.
168. Ross, supra note 85, at 238.
169. Committee, supra note 16, at 203.
170. Richmond, supra note 144, at 210 n.21.
171. Watson, supra note 12, at 200.
172. Ross, supra note 85, at 247.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 247-48.
175. Reed, supra note 5, at 103.
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unsophisticated clients, to understand the basis of the fee clearly.' 76 An
advantage hybrid fees have over a straight contingency fee is that clients
may avoid paying a perceived windfall fee if the lawyer obtains an early
favorable recovery. 1
77
Such hybrid fees might endanger the quality of work unless quality
controls are institutionalized.178 This type of billing should only be used
when the work involves a typical pattern and the fee charger mix to do
the work is reasonably foreseeable; if the matters subject to the
agreement vary in the required level of expertise and specialization or in
the responsibility assumed, it should not be used. 179 As far as minima
and maxima are part of the agreement, the lawyer has to be especially
careful because caps can be "dangerous and unfair"'180 and formalized
fees with minima might be a violation of antitrust laws.'
8
'
Relative-value billing is prone to abuse especially because many
lawyers value bill their clients without their clients' knowledge.
182
Another significant ethical problem with value billing is the degree of
discretion it gives a lawyer in determining legal fees. Because clients
often do not know how difficult or easy it was to obtain a particular
result in a matter, they rely on their lawyers to tell them whether the
result was a good one or not.18 3  The temptation for lawyers to
misrepresent and deceive is greater in value billing than with hourly
billing; finally, there is a risk that fees based on value billing will be
unreasonable or excessive.' 84  The determination of value in the
production of legal services may or may not coincide with the client's
perception of value. This method should only be used when the tasks to
be performed can be classified and are reasonably predictable.
185
A contingent hourly-percentage fee is praised as "uniquely sound
and practical."'186 The authors think that this system solves the problems
associated with hourly and contingent fees. Because of its contingency,
the system would facilitate access by the poor to legal services. It would
measure well the cost to the lawyer and the value to the client of the legal
services rendered. Its practicability would make implementation
feasible. A contingent hourly-percentage fee would also mitigate the
176. ZITRIN & LANGFORD, supra note 11, at 192.
177. Massey & D'Amour, supra note 14, at 120.
178. Reed, supra note 5, at 94.
179. Id.
180. CLARK JR., supra note 86, at 184.
181. Selinger, supra note 87, at 675.
182. Chan, supra note 11, at 627.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 628.
185. Reed, supra note 5, at 104.
186. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 101, at 598.
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client's dissatisfaction with having to pay for losing. 8 7 The percentage
component would reward the lawyer for effective representation, thus
giving him a direct economic incentive to work as diligently and
efficiently as possible. The system would encourage small, meritorious
claims and discourage nuisance suits, 188 and it would eliminate interest
conflicts between lawyer and client over the timing of recovery. 89
VIII. Proposals
As we have seen, most of the billing systems have advantages and
disadvantages. Neither of the two main methods, either contingent fees
or hourly billing, is fully satisfying. In my opinion, the most convincing
alternative is the contingent hourly-percentage fee. This proposed fee
would be payable only in the event of recovery and would be computed
by adding the lawyer's time charge for the hours worked to a small
percentage of 5-10% of the amount by which the recovery exceeds that
time charge. 90 We have seen that this method does not have many
disadvantages but combines a lot of the advantages of the two main
billing methods.
The only significant drawback of the two present fee systems that
the proposed fee fails to eliminate is the possibility of abuse by the
lawyer in setting the fee. 191 The hourly component of the pro-posed fee
is still a danger of bill-padding. The element of contin-gency is still a
risk of overreaching. To control abuse in setting a fee, it would have to
suffice the criterion of reasonableness. 1
92
The structure of the proposed fee is simple enough that both clients
and lawyers should not have problems to understand it.' 93 Although the
proposed fee is innovative, the fee does not differ drastically from the
predominant forms. The clients should, however, still be able to decide
whether or not they want the contingency feature; and in certain areas of
legal practice, the proposed fee would not work, but the hourly fee
would. 194  I do not see any major problems connected with the
inquisitorial system that would prevent this system from being effective
also in Switzerland. The ban on the contingency feature could therefore,
in my opinion, be lifted in Switzerland for this system.
Banning the contingency factor in billing could have several
187. Id. at 578.
188. Id. at 579.
189. Id. at 580.
190. Id. at 598.
191. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 101, at 580.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 581.
194. Id. at 599.
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consequences, among them an increase in illegal behavior to achieve
contracts with contingency features, 95 an increase of sales of claims to
lawyers, 196 and an increase in litigation insurance.197 Trial would become
a less credible threat, as the defendant would know that the plaintiff has
to pay new money to go to trial after pre-trial negotiations. The abolition
of the contingency feature could probably cause a significant reduction in
litigation. Self-representation in court would rise, and representation by
a lawyer would much more be a question of wealth.198 The consequence
of this could be a simplification of the procedures and the creation of
alternatives to formal litigation. 99 Finally, the need for legal aid would
certainly significantly rise.
In Switzerland, legal aid is an important factor for the access of
indigent parties to the courts and can be seen as a substitute for the
contingency fee system.200 If a party cannot afford a trial and the case is
not frivolous, she does not have to pay the court's fees and the fee of her
lawyer. The government pays these fees unless the indigent party wins
the case. If the indigent party wins the case, the losing party has to pay
these fees. The government can require a payback from the losing
indigent party during 10 years after the trial if the party gets money in
this period, e.g., by inheriting a certain sum or by winning in a lottery. A
lawyer can be forced to take over a case of an indigent party although the
fee is only 80% of the normal fee.2° '
The introduction of a fee system with a contingency feature like the
one described in this paragraph or the introduction of a straight
contingent fee would most probably reduce the consider-able amount of
money spent every year by Swiss cantonal governments for legal aid.
The introduction of a contingency-based system would equal lawyers in
Switzerland with fiduciaries, tax consultants and banks who all are
already allowed to bill on a contingent fee basis.
20 2
It is possible that courts in Switzerland would grant higher damages,
especially in personal injury cases, if lawyers were paid on a contingent
fee basis. Swiss courts grant only fractions of the sums awarded by
195. Gross, supra note 7, at 323.
196. Id at 325.
197. Id. at 330.
198. Id. at 339, 342.
199. Id at 337-38.
200. TESTA, supra note 43, at 229.
201. The reduction by 20% is seen as a compensation for the fact that the lawyer has a
secure payer, the government, and does not have to worry about fee-collection. I do not
base this information on specific literature because I think a thorough treatment of legal
aid would be beyond the scope of this article. I have described the general principles as
they are applicable in every Swiss canton. See also Rule 16 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (appendix).
202. HOCHLI, supra note 37, at 102 n.433.
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American courts in such cases. The reasons are manyfold: Swiss law
knows neither punitive damages and damages for pain or emotional
distress nor class actions, and the trials are held without juries so that the
judges determine the amount of damages awarded.
The only Swiss author who has tried to examine the consequences
of the introduction of a contingency fee has reached the conclusion that
not much would change, neither in trials nor in the nonforensic
lawyering, because the contingency fee would only apply to plaintiffs,
only in some areas of the law, and only to cases with high amounts in
controversy.2 °3 He did not see the solution for the existing problems in
the introduction of the contingency fee system but in the introduction of
a system where court and lawyer fees would be calculated proportionate
to income and fortune of the parties.2
Besides this and irrespective of the billing system, there could be
more improvements. Better and more communication between lawyer
and client seems to be a major concern. 20 5 The other suggestions range
from tightening the ethical standards 20 6 and intro-ducing mandatory CLE
courses concerning billing20 7 to imposing audit billing systems 20 8 and
monitoring of junior lawyers' billing by senior lawyers.2 °9
On the side of the lawyers, avoiding billing and fee problems can be
as simple as picking the right clients, including a thorough conflicts
check. 210 The clients, on the other hand, should actively and aggressively
participate in the billing process and scrutinize their lawyers' bills.2 1
Last but not least, the exercise of disciplinary powers and a restrictive
judicial scrutiny of lawyers' bills can help achieve higher ethical
standards with billing.
212
IX. Conclusion
Billing methods are a subject that is seen to be "very much in
flux." 2 13  This might be the time to re-examine ethics in the billing
203. GATTIKER, supra note 36, at 138-39.
204. Id. at 139.
205. Richmond, supra note 84, at 285; Watson, supra note 12, at 189, 200; Massey &
D'Amour, supra note 14, at 117; Louisiana State Bar Association (hereinafter Louisiana
Bar), Lawyers Helping Lawyers, LA BAR J., August/ September, 142, 143 (2001).
206. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 10 1, at 593 n.218.
207. Watson, supra note 12, at 200.
208. Ross, supra note 85, at 250.
209. Ross, supra note 15, at 89.
210. Louisiana Bar, supra note 205, at 142.
211. Chan, supra note 11, at 635; Ross, supra note 15, at 88.
212. Porcu, supra note 60, at 155; MACKINNON, supra note 21, at 205; Chan, supra
note 11, at 636; Ross, supra note 85, at 252; Clermont & Currivan, supra note 101, at
593 n.218.
213. Committee, supra note 16, at 177.
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context. Increased economical pressure carries the danger of engaging in
unethical billing. Auditors are split on whether time-based billing is the
engine driving the overbilling machine. 214 The prevalence of time-based
billing encourages resistance to less adversarial forms of litigation that
would better serve the truth-finding function of litigation without
significantly eroding its adversarial foundations.215
A 1985 study came to the conclusion that hypotheses about the
relationship between fee arrangements and the way lawyers handle civil
cases are misleading, at best.216 The survey showed that in cases
involving less than $ 10,000, contingent fee lawyers would usually spend
less time on a case than hourly fee lawyers; above that level, the opposite
effect appeared to occur.217
Unethical billing harms the client, the legal profession, the courts,
and the public. 18 One problem is that the most specific guidelines
cannot anticipate the infinite number of ethical dilemmas billing lawyers
encounter.219 Another problem is that a change in the ethical rules is not
likely to have much effect if the unscrupulous lawyer's tendency of
dishonestly billing is based on a flaw in his character.2 20 Ethical billing
requires constant sensitivity to the inherent conflict between the
economic interests of the lawyer and the real needs of the client.21
Ethical billing also requires a vigilant awareness of the potentials for
abuse that are endemic to a system of time-based billing.
222
When considering possible changes to the present system, it is
important to keep the purposes of the legal system in mind
(compensation for injured parties, administering justice, prevention of
future wrongs, livelihood of lawyers). 23 Creative billing methods can be
a market asset. But no billing method is without faults. And, as always,
there is no simple solution to lawyers' unethical behavior. An ethical
lawyer following the professional model will charge a fair fee no matter
what method is used. But we should not end up like Richard A.
Salomon, a rising-star Chicago law firm partner who consistently billed
more than 3,000 hours annually by adopting a routine of reclassifying
nonrecoverable client costs for billing purposes and in all seriousness
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blamed a psychological disorder as main reason for his unethical
behavior
224
224. Ricker, supra note 214, at 64.
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON LAWYER'S FEES
Appendix: Swiss Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(professional unauthorized translation)
A General Duties
1. The Lawyer shall practice his profession completely independently.
2. The Lawyer shall be under a duty to examine conscientiously the
matters entrusted to him. He shall only represent matters for which
he can be responsible before the law and his conscience.
3. The lawyer shall, in the practice of his profession, only use the
means which are permissible according to the law.
4. The lawyer shall refrain from all activities which run contrary to the
dignity of his status.
5. The lawyer shall promote the settlement of disputes out of court,
provided that this is in the interests of the client, and as advising
lawyer, shall consider the essence and purpose of mediation, in
connection with which he shall respect the decisions of the client,
and shall limit himself to legal advice. The lawyer shall be bound
clearly to ascertain his client from the outset (representative, advice
to one side only, joint consultation, mediation).
6. Advertising for lawyers shall be allowed within the federal and
cantonal statutory limitations in preservation of the dignity of the
profession of lawyer and respect for professional secrecy.
The cantonal societies reserve the right to make more precise
regulations within the scope of these basic principles.
7. annulled
8. annulled
9. The lawyer shall only make contact with persons who can be
considered to be witnesses, as an exception and when this is
necessary for the preparation of proceedings. He shall avoid any
suspicion of influencing them.
It shall not be permissible to send the witnesses instructions or rules
of conduct.
B. Duties Towards the Client
10. The lawyer shall be under an obligation of loyalty and
confidentiality towards the client.
The duty to maintain silence shall also extend to partners and
employees.
The duty to maintain silence shall also continue to exist after
instructions have been fulfilled.
The lawyer may also invoke the duty to maintain silence if the client
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has released him therefrom, if he considers it to be in the interests of
the client.
11. The lawyer shall never serve different persons whose interests
conflict.
12. The lawyer shall treat entrusted property with care and shall at all
times be in a position to return it. Monies belonging to the client
shall be forwarded without delay. The right of the lawyer to pay
himself for his claim shall remain reserved.
13. The lawyer shall charge within the scope of the usage applicable in
his canton, in the absence of agreement with the client as to
professional fee.
The lawyer may not share in the proceeds of proceedings in the
place of a professional fee (pactum de quota litis) or accept in
advance an unfavourable outcome to the proceedings. The lawyer
may agree an all-inclusive fee for legal advice. This should
correspond with the expected services of the lawyer.
14. The lawyer may not enter into an agreement with any person which
infringes the basic principle of free choice of lawyer.
15. The lawyer shall normally be required to demand reasonable
advance payment on account of costs.
16. The lawyer shall handle legally-aided cases with the same care as
other cases and shall be content with the legal aid professional fee,
unless the impoverished party comes into wealth.
17. The lawyer shall normally receive the client at his office and shall
give no legal advice outside of the same.
18. The lawyer shall ensure that the interests of the client and
professional secrecy shall survive his death.
C. Duties Towards Other Lawyers
19. The lawyer shall not make a personal attack on other lawyers.
He shall be entitled to copies of applications without demand unless
this is done by the court or official authority where the matter is
pending. This rule shall not apply to proceedings in camera (for
example, in preliminary investigations in criminal proceedings).
20. Where a lawyer accepts instructions in a matter in which another
lawyer was involved, he shall inform this lawyer. The duty to
maintain lawyer confidentiality remains reserved.
21. The lawyer shall not deal directly with the opposing party who is
represented by an authorised lawyer, without his consent.
22. The lawyer shall approach the President of the Cantonal Bar
Association or his deputy before taking any kind of preventive
measures, if the lawyer shall determine a breach of a professional
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duty by another lawyer.
The lawyer shall carefully examine whether action against the other
lawyer is necessary in the interests of the client, where he has
accepted instructions to act against another lawyer. He shall afford
the other lawyer the opportunity of settling the matter out of court
prior to filing a civil action, and he shall notify the matter to the
President of the Cantonal Bar Association or his deputy prior to
laying information.
23. A lawyer who has a personal dispute with another lawyer shall
notify the President of the Cantonal Bar Association of this before
proceeding.
He shall approach the President of the Cantonal Bar Association
before commencing judicial proceedings.
24. The rules concerning the conduct between lawyers shall also apply
to lawyers of other cantons and foreign lawyers. A lawyer who is
required to take proceedings against a lawyer of another canton
shall approach directly or through the good offices of the council of
his Cantonal Bar Association, the President of the Bar Association
or his deputy to which the other lawyer belongs. The same
provisions shall apply to disputes with non-members in connection
with which the President of the cantonal organisation at the place of
residence of the non-member shall be responsible.
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